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Secure Communication Using Qubits∗
Saied Hosseini-Khayat†, Iman Marvian‡
Abstract
A two-layer quantum protocol for secure transmission of data using qubits is pre-
sented. The protocol is an improvement over the BB84 QKD protocol. BB84, in con-
junction with the one-time pad algorithm, has been shown to be unconditionally secure.
However it suffers from two drawbacks: (1) Its security relies on the assumption that
Alice’s qubit source is perfect in the sense that it does not inadvertently emit multiple
copies of the same qubit. A multi-qubit emission attack can be launched if this assump-
tion is violated. (2) BB84 cannot transfer predetermined keys; the keys it can distribute
are generated in the process. Our protocol does not have these drawbacks.
As in BB84, our protocol requires an authenticated public channel so as to detect an
intruder’s interaction with the quantum channel, but unlike in symmetric-key cryptog-
raphy, the confidentiality of transmitted data does not rely on a shared secret key.
Key words: quantum cryptography, key distribution, data security.
1 Introduction
Since the appearance of the BB84 protocol [1], a growing class of quantum cryptographic
protocols has emerged. BB84 and its variants [3, 5] aim at providing perfect security in
transferring classical data between two parties. However, these protocols are key establish-
ment protocols rather than data transfer protocols. They provide ultimate data security by
generating a random sequence of bit which is shared between Alice and Bob. The sequence
is then used as a one-time pad or as a symmetric key. Because this sequence is generated in
the process of protocol execution, it cannot be known in advance. This can be a drawback in
applications where a predefined sequence of bits is to be distributed securely. Our protocol
can be used to avoid this drawback. Also, though expensive, in some applications it may
be justifiable to use the quantum channel to send confidential data as opposed to using the
classical channel. Our protocol can be used in those situations as well.
It has been shown that BB84 is unconditionally secure [2, 4]. However this fact depends
on the assumption that the qubit source does not emit multiple replicas of the same qubit.
In BB84, Alice generates a sequence of qubits which have been chosen at random from one
of two predefined bases. She then sends a random sequence of bits using those qubits. Bob
makes measurement on the qubits upon receipt and then waits for the basis information
from Alice. The basis information comes through a public authenticated channel. If the
qubit source emits multiple replicas for each intended qubit, an eavesdropper (Eve) on the
quantum channel can capture and preserve the qubits until the basis is announced by Alice.
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At that time, Eve can perform measurement in the correct basis and obtain the bits send
by Alice. This is called a multi-qubit emission attack. Our protocol is not vulnerable to
this kind of attack because information crucial to correct measurement of the qubits is not
transmitted or broadcast.
In our protocol, as in BB84 and other key exchange protocols, the availability of an
authenticated (though not private) channel is an indispensable element. This channel is the
very essential means by which Bob can identify Alice and differentiates her from Eve. In
key exchange protocols without an authenticated channel, Eve can launch a successful man-
in-the-middle attack. In our protocol, qubits are exchanged between Alice and Bob, and
they must make sure that the qubits are not altered or inserted by Eve. An authenticated
channel is required for them to ensure this.
Our protocol has two major advantages over BB84 (explained above), but it comes at
a cost: The qubits must make a round trip instead of a one-way trip. At a time when
sending qubits over long distances is a technical challenge, this requirement may sound too
troublesome. However, there is a trade-off: A round trip must be weighted against the
challenge of making a single-qubit source.
This paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we present the key ideas and
properties used in our protocol. Then in Section 3, the proposed protocols are presented.
In Section 4, we discuss the correctness and security of our protocol. At last in Section 5,
we summarize the results of our paper. The appendix contains some of the technical points
that are necessary but are not crucial to understanding the concepts.
2 Preliminaries
In this paper, we have borrowed some key concepts from BB84. One key concept which
is not from BB84 is the following: Suppose Bob wants to send one bit to Alice. Alice sends
a random bit to Bob and she remembers this bit. Bob performs an exclusive-or between
Alice’s bit and his bit and sends the result to back Alice. Alice can recover Bob’s bit. This
is perfectly secure if Eve cannot inspect Alice’s bit on the way to Bob. If Eve inspects the
bit being sent from Bob to Alice, she will not know Bob’s bit. Of course, we should also
prevent the possibility of a man-in-the-middle attack by Eve.
It is hard to realize the above idea in classical cryptography. However, in quantum
cryptography this can be realized at least in one way that is presented in this paper.
The whole idea of quantum cryptography revolves around the concept of a qubit. A
qubit |ψ〉 is a quantum state vector in a two dimensional Hilbert space H2. A qubit can be
measured with respect to any given basis in H2. In quantum computation, the basis {|0〉, |1〉}
is called the computational basis. Measuring a qubit |ψ〉 = a|0〉+ b|1〉 in the computational
basis will change it to |0〉 or |1〉 with probabilities |a|2 and |b|2, respectively. The observed
outcome is logic value ’0’ with probability |a|2 or logic value ’1’ probability |b|2. Hereafter,
whenever a qubit is ”measured”, we mean it is measured in the computational basis.
In protocols discussed in this paper, Alice and Bob rotate qubits around a known fixed
axis in the Bloch sphere [6, page 15]. Without loss of generality and for the sake of conve-
nience, we choose this axis to be the y-axis. To perform a rotation around the y-axis by an
angle θ, a given qubit |ψ〉 must be operated upon by the following operator:
R(θ) =
(
cos θ
2
− sin θ
2
sin θ
2
cos θ
2
)
.
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It is easy to verify that for all angles α, β and θ, the following statements hold:
R(α)R(β) = R(β)R(α) = R(α+ β), R†(θ) = R(−θ).
We will work with the following family of qubits:
|ψ(θ)〉 = R(θ)|0〉 = cos
θ
2
|0〉 + sin
θ
2
|1〉.
Since |0〉 is the state vector coinciding with the unit vector along the z-axis in the Bloch
sphere, then every |ψ(θ)〉 is a rotated version of the qubit |0〉 rotated by an angle θ around
the y-axis in the xz -plane. Also be reminded that any two qubits whose Bloch sphere
representations are colinear and point in opposite directions, e.g. |ψ(θ)〉 and |ψ(θ+pi)〉, are
orthogonal to each other and hence they can be detected and distinguished with perfect
certainty.
Suppose |ψ(θ)〉 is known by Alice to encode one of two logic values 0 or 1. If she makes
measurement in the computational basis on this qubit, she will obtain 0 with probability
cos2 θ
2
and will obtain 1 with probability sin2 θ
2
. However if Alice knows the value of θ, and
if she operates R†(θ) on this qubit before making measurement in the computational basis,
then she will obtain 0 with probability 1 (perfect certainty).
Now suppose that Alice receives |φ〉 and she knows this qubit is either |ψ(θ)〉, or |ψ(θ+
pi)〉. Without knowing θ, if she makes measurement, the outcome will be 0 or 1 at random,
the probability of each depending on the actual state she received. On the other hand,
if Alice knows the value of θ, she can perform the unitary operation R†(θ)|φ〉 and then
followed by measurement in the computational basis. With probability one, she will obtain
0 if |φ〉 = |ψ(θ)〉 or obtain 1 if |φ〉 = |ψ(θ + pi)〉. Therefore with known angle θ, the states
|ψ(θ)〉 and |ψ(θ+pi)〉 represent 0 and 1, respectively, and can be distinguished with perfect
certainty.
In what follows, we use the random variable X to denote the binary information trans-
mitted, the random variable Y to denote the binary information received by an intended
party, and the random variable Z to denote the information bit obtained by an intruder.
Adopting Shannon’s definition, we deem a protocol as unconditionally secure if H(X|Y ) = 0
and H(X|Z) = H(X). The first condition means that Y reveals everything about X. The
latter means that Z reveals nothing about X; this is true if and only if X and Z are
independent.
We now prove some propositions that represent our key ideas and will be used later.
Consider a set of distinct angles {θ0, θ1, . . . , θn−1}, all in [0, 2pi]. Suppose Alice prepares a
qubit |ψ〉 = R(θk + piX)|0〉, where θk was selected with probability pk, and X ∈ {0, 1} is a
binary random variable (which is Alice’s data).
Proposition 1 If Alice sends the qubit to Bob. If Bob knows θk, he can recover X without
error.
Proof.
Bob can perform a unitary operation and obtain |φ〉 as follows: |φ〉 = R†(θ)|ψ〉 He then
makes measurement to obtain Y . We have:
|φ〉 = cos(piX/2)|0〉 + sin(piX/2)|1〉
Prob(Y = 0 | X = 0) = 1, Prob(Y = 1 | X = 0) = 0
Prob(Y = 0 | X = 1) = 0, Prob(Y = 1 | X = 1) = 1.
This obviously implies: H(X|Y ) = 0. Hence the desired conclusion follows. ✸
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Proposition 2 Alice sends the qubit to Bob. Eve, who does not knows θk, intercepts and
rotates it by an arbitrary angle of her choice −α, makes measurement on the qubit and
obtains a binary value Z. There exist a probability distribution pk and a set {θ0, θ1, . . . , θn−1}
such that H(X|Z) = H(X).
Proof.
We have:
|ψ〉 = cos[(θk + piX)/2] |0〉 + sin[(θk + piX)/2] |1〉
Eve’s rotation produces:
R(−α)|ψ〉 = cos[(θk + piX − α)/2] |0〉 + sin[(θk + piX − α)/2] |1〉.
The probabilities for Eve’s measurement outcome is:
Prob(Z = 0 | k,X = 0) = cos2
θk − α
2
, Prob(Z = 0 | k,X = 1) = sin2
θk − α
2
,
Prob(Z = 1 | k,X = 0) = sin2
θk − α
2
, Prob(Z = 1 | k,X = 1) = cos2
θk − α
2
.
Therefore:
Prob(Z = 0 | X = 0) = Prob(Z = 1 | X = 1) =
n−1∑
k=0
pk cos
2 θk − α
2
,
Prob(Z = 0 | X = 1) = Prob(Z = 1 | X = 0) =
n−1∑
k=0
pk sin
2 θk − α
2
.
The variables X and Z are independent if and only if:
Prob(Z = 0 | X = 0) = Prob(Z = 0 | X = 1),
Prob(Z = 1 | X = 0) = Prob(Z = 1 | X = 1).
Therefore H(X|Z) = H(X) if and only if:
n−1∑
k=0
pk cos
2 θk − α
2
=
n−1∑
k=0
pk sin
2 θk − α
2
. (1)
We must find pk’s and θk’s such that Equation (1) holds regardless of the choice of α. In
Appendix A, Claim 1, it is shown that this is possible by setting
n ≥ 2, pk =
1
n
, θk =
2kpi
n
, for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 1.
Thus the conclusion follows. ✸
Proposition 3 Suppose Alice sends the qubit to Bob. Eve who does not knows θk intercepts
the qubit and performs a rotation by an angle of her choice α. She then makes measure-
ment on the qubit and then transmits the resulting qubit, denoted |φ1〉, to Bob. If Bob
knows θk, and if he performs the following unitary operation |φ2〉 = R
†(θ)|φ1〉 followed by a
measurement of |φ2〉, then the channel between Alice and Bob has an error probability equal
to:
Prob(error) =
n−1∑
k=0
pk
[
sin2
θk
2
cos2
θk − α
2
+ cos2
θk
2
sin2
θk − α
2
]
.
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Proof.
We are looking for P (Y |X) and do this by conditioning on Z and k.
P (Y |X) =
∑
k
∑
Z
P (Y |X,Z, k)P (Z|X, k)P (k|X).
Since k is chosen with probability pk independent of X, then
P (k|X) = pk, k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1.
After Eve’s measurement, there are two cases to consider:
1. Z = 0. In this case: |φ1〉 = |0〉. After Bob’s rotation. we have
|φ2〉 = R
†(θ)|φ1〉 = cos
θk
2
|0〉 − sin
θk
2
|1〉.
After Bob’s measurement we have:
Prob(Y = 0 | k,X,Z = 0) = cos2
θk
2
, Prob(Y = 1 | k,X,Z = 0) = sin2
θk
2
.
2. Z = 1. In this case: |φ1〉 = |1〉. After Bob’s rotation. we have
|φ2〉 = R
†(θ)|φ1〉 = sin
θk
2
|0〉 + cos
θk
2
|1〉.
After Bob’s measurement we have:
Prob(Y = 0 | k,X,Z = 1) = sin2
θk
2
, Prob(Y = 1 | k,X,Z = 1) = cos2
θk
2
.
The conditional probabilities for Z given X, k were obtained in Proposition (2). Using
those, we can compute the following:
Prob(Y = 0 | X = 0) = Prob(Y = 1 | X = 1) =
n−1∑
k=0
pk
[
sin2
θk
2
sin2
θk − α
2
+ cos2
θk
2
cos2
θk − α
2
]
,
Prob(Y = 0 | X = 1) = Prob(Y = 1 | X = 0) =
n−1∑
k=0
pk
[
sin2
θk
2
cos2
θk − α
2
+ cos2
θk
2
sin2
θk − α
2
]
.
Note that:
Prob(error) = P (X = 0)P (Y = 1|X = 0) + P (X = 1)P (Y = 0|X = 1)
Therefore regardless of P (X) we find:
Prob(error) =
n−1∑
k=0
pk
[
sin2
θk
2
cos2
θk − α
2
+ cos2
θk
2
sin2
θk − α
2
]
. (2)
The proof is complete. ✸
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Proposition 4 In Proposition 3, suppose we set
n > 2, pk =
1
n
, θk =
2kpi
n
,
then
Prob(error) ≥
1
4
,
with equality when α = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A, Claim 2. ✸
This proposition means that by certain choice of pk’s and θk’s (as prescribed above) we
can be sure that Eve’s interaction will be detected with probability at least 1/4. Also, from
the point of view of Eve, who wants to minimize her probability of being detected, this
means that her best strategy is to do measurement only without any rotations. This result
will be used in the analysis of our qubit authentication protocol (Protocol 1).
3 Proposed Protocol
First we present a protocol for sending authenticated qubits. Then we present a protocol
for sending secure data using authenticated qubits.
3.1 Sending Authentic Qubits
We define an authentic qubit as a qubit which has been sent by Alice and received by
Bob such that Eve has not altered it in any way along the way. Suppose Alice wants to
send authentic qubits to Bob. For convenience, we restrict our discussion to the family of
qubits residing in the xz -plane.
Protocol 1 Suppose Alice has a sequence of N qubits |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉, . . . , |ψN 〉, and wishes
to send them to Bob in an authenticated way. We assume that a classical bidirectional
authenticated channel exists between Alice and Bob. Also assumed is a set of publicly-
known distinct angles θk =
2kpi
n
, k = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1.
1. Alice selectsM integers uniformly at random in {0, 1, . . . , n−1}, denoted k1, k2, . . . , kM .
2. Alice creates qubits |φ1〉, |φ1〉, . . . , |φM 〉, such that for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}
|φi〉 = R(2kipi/n) |0〉.
We call these the check qubits.
3. Alice generates M distinct random integers j1, j2, . . . , jM in {1, 2, . . . , N +M}. She
then creates a frame of length N +M and inserts each |φi〉 at location ji in the frame.
Then the sequence of qubits |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉, . . . , |ψN 〉, are inserted at the empty locations
in the frame preserving their order.
4. Alice sends the frame to Bob. Bob receives the frame.
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5. Alice sends the following data to Bob:
(j1, k1), (j2, k2), . . . , (jM , kM ).
These data are sent via the classical authenticated channel. Eve can read these data.
6. Knowing ji’s, Bob extracts the sequence of |φi〉’s from the frame, and for each i =
1, 2, . . . ,M , he performs R†(2kipi/n)|φi〉. Then he measures the resulting state. The
outcome must be a logical ’0’ for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}. If this condition does not hold
for any |φi〉, the frame is said to have an authentication error.
7. If there is an authentication error, Bob notifies Alice and both drop the frame. Oth-
erwise, the frame is considered unaltered and the sequence of |ψi〉’s is deemed to be
authentic.
At a given level of certainty (determined by parameters N and M), this protocol uses a
classical authenticated channel to create an authenticated quantum channel. This protocol
is analyzed in Section 4. We use this protocol as a tool to prevent the man-in-the-middle
attack in our confidential data transfer protocol (Protocol 2).
3.2 Sending Confidential Qubits
In this section, we present a protocol that enables sending confidential data over the
quantum channel. In this protocol, qubits make a round trip from Alice to Bob to Alice
and undergo a unitary operation by Bob along the way. The protocol is described below.
Protocol 2 Suppose Bob has a sequence of N data bits x1, x2, . . . , xN where xi ∈ {0, 1}.
The existence of a classical bidirectional authenticated channel exists between Alice and
Bob is assumed.
1. Alice generates a sequence of random integers k1, k2, . . . , kN where ki ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n−
1}. She keeps these integers confidential to herself.
2. Alice creates n qubits |ψ11〉, |ψ12〉, . . . , |ψ1N 〉, such that |ψ1i〉 = R(
2piki
n
)|0〉.
3. Alice sends the N qubits to Bob using Protocol 1.
4. Bob receives the N authenticated qubits from Alice. On each |ψ1i〉, without making
measurement, he performs the unitary operation R(pixi) to produce the qubit sequence
|ψ21〉, |ψ22〉, . . . , |ψ2N 〉
where |ψ2i〉 = R(pixi)|ψ1i〉. This sequence is sent to Alice in an authenticated way
using Protocol 1.
5. Alice receives the N authenticated qubits. On each qubit |ψ2i〉, she perform unitary
operation R†(2piki
n
). The resulting sequence denoted
|ψ31〉, |ψ32〉, . . . , |ψ3N 〉
is then measured to produce bit sequence y1, y2, . . . , yN . This sequence is deemed to
be the sequence sent by Bob.
As shown in Propositions 1 through 4, there seems to be no advantage in selecting n > 3.
Therefore we propose setting n = 3 in both protocols.
4 Analysis
In this section, we analyze the two protocols to show that they indeed serve their in-
tended purposes. In our analysis, we take advantage of the propositions set forward in the
preliminary section. Since our primary purpose in this paper is introducing a protocol for
confidential data transfer, We analyze Protocol 1 first while assuming Protocol 2 serves its
purpose perfectly (i.e., sending authentic qubits).
4.1 Analysis of Protocol 2
We analyze this protocol in two steps: First we show it is correct, second, we show it is
secure.
Correctness
We show that Protocol 2 works correctly by invoking Proposition 1. Notice that Alice
prepares each qubit |ψ1i〉 at a certain angle
2piki
n
which she only knows. Bob encodes his
data bit in the qubit by performing R(pixi)|ψ1i〉. Doing so means that Alice’s qubit either
remains the same or is rotated by an angle pi. In Proposition 1, Alice encodes her data and
sends to Bob. If Bob knows the original qubit’s angle can recover Alice’s data. In the case
of Protocol 2 (which is slightly different), it is Bob who encodes his data, but since he does
not know the qubit’s angle, he sends it to Alice who (by the reason of Proposition 1) can
recover Bob’s data without error. Therefore, Protocol 2 is correct.
Security
We show that Protocol 2 is secure. This means that an intruder (Eve) cannot recover Bob’s
data. We do this in the following:
a) Note that if Eve can find out the angle 2piki
n
for each qubit |ψ1i〉, she, like Alice, can
recover Bob’s data. An invocation of Proposition 2 will prove that this is not possible.
First notice that Protocol 2 uses the specific set of pk’s and θk’s that satisfies Propo-
sition 2 for security. (Thus Equation (1) is satisfied.) Next, notice that the first
trip of a qubit from Alice to Bob corresponds to the same trip in Proposition 2 with
the exception that Alice’s data is set to a constant logic ’0’. Since the condition for
Equation (1) is met by our specific choice of pk’s and θk’s, therefore:
Prob(Z = 0 | X = 0) = Prob(Z = 1 | X = 0) =
1
2
.
This means that when Eve (intercepts and ) measures each |ψ1i〉 ( possibly after
a rotation of her choice), then she observes logic ’0’ or ’1’ with equal probability,
regardless of Alice’s choice of angle 2piki
n
. Therefore, she can’t get any information
about the qubit’s angle in its trip from Alice to Bob.
b) Although the conclusion in item b) is good news, note that if there are only two angles
for Alice to choose from (i.e., n = 2) then that conclusion will break down because
Eve know Alice’s data is ’0’, and since Alice can only prepare one of the two states
R(0)|0〉 or R(pi)|0〉, then Eve can find out the angle with certainty because the two
states are orthogonal. Therefore we have to impose the condition n > 2 for the sake
of security.
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c) To show that performing Protocol 1 is essential in the first leg of the trip, we assume
that Alice sends the qubits to Bob without performing Protocol 1 (thus modifying
Step 3 in Protocol 2). While Eve can get no information about the specific choice
of qubit angles by Alice, Eve is still able to launch the following man-in-the-middle
attack:
Eve intercepts and performs measurement on Alice’s qubits. This allows her to know
the state of each qubit (they will be either |0〉 or |1〉.) She then sends these to
Bob. (Or she might as well drop Alice’s qubits and send her own.) Bob, who is
not aware, encodes his data in Eve’s qubits and send them to Alice. Eve intercepts,
makes measurement (thus perfectly recovering Bob’s data), and then sends arbitrary
qubits to Alice. Alice’s measurements (after appropriate rotations that she knows) will
produce gibberish. But Eve has managed to steal Bob’s data. Thus it is absolutely
essential that Bob knows that the qubits he receives are authentic; that is, they
come from Alice without Eve having the opportunity to intervene. This is the job of
Protocol 1 (assuming it works flawlessly.)
d) On the return trip for qubits (from Bob to Alice), Eve can intercept and make mea-
surement on the qubits. These qubits carry data, however a direct invocation of
Proposition 2 shows that no data can be gained by Eve if she intercepts (Apply
Proposition 2). However, if Bob does not use Protocol 1 (in Step 4) in transmitting
the qubits back to Alice, a malicious Eve can intercept, drop the qubits and insert
her own. In this case, Alice will receive gibberish instead of meaningful data. This is
a disruption of communication as opposed to compromised security.
e) In this and the next items, we show security against multi-qubit emission attack.
Suppose a qubit source used by Alice is imperfect and for each intended qubit it
creates multiple replicas in exactly the same state as the original. This can create a
severe security problem in BB84: Eve can capture and preserve a replica qubit and
wait until the angle information is announced on the public channel. She then can
perform measurement in the correct basis and recover the data. This cannot happen
in Protocol 2 because no such information concerning the data carrying qubits is ever
sent. Only in Protocol 1, angle information about the check qubits are sent on the
public channel. This cannot give away information about Bob’s data. We will deal
with the check qubits when we analyze Protocol 1.
f) Another attack using multiple qubits is the following: In Step 3, Protocol 2, Alice
sends qubits to Bob. Because of the multiple-qubit imperfection, Eve can capture
and preserve a qubit replica for each original qubit Alice sends. During the execution
of protocol 1, the check qubits are identified, therefore Eve can throw them away. She
keeps the non-check qubits which are intended for carrying data. In the return trip,
Bob sends the data carrying qubits encoded with his data. Not knowing the qubit’s
angles, Eve cannot extract any information from the replicas she received from Alice
nor from the originals or replicas she receives from Bob. (Now assume Protocol 1 is
not perform in the return trip at Step 4.) Eve can drop Bob’s qubits and insert her
own. These are the replicas she kept now encoded with her fake data. This data can
be received and understood by Alice. This attack affects the integrity of data rather
than its confidentiality.
However, this attack cannot succeed because of using Protocol 1 at Step 4. At Step
4, Bob sends his qubits (|ψi〉’s) along with the check qubits (|φi〉’s) he inserts in the
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frame. Eve who receives all these qubits has no information about the position of these
qubits. Therefore she cannot replace the non-check qubits with her own. She can at
best make a random guess about the position of N non-check qubits and attempt to
replace them. Eve must be at least 1 in
(
N+M
N
)
lucky to succeed. This means that by
a choice of sufficiently large N and M , her luck can be made completely insignificant.
Remember that these two parameters can be set to exceed any given numbers. If
necessary, an appropriate padding algorithm can extend the length N of Bob’s data
to a required minimum. Therefore, we have justified the use of Protocol 1 in Step 4,
and thus removed the possibility of using multiple-qubit attack.
Up to now, we have discussed the various ways Protocol 2 can be attacked, and have
shown that none can succeed. As it was seen, the security of Protocol 1 was a key assump-
tion. In the next section, we turn to analyzing this assumption.
4.2 Analysis of Protocol 1
We show that Protocol 1 allows Alice to send Bob authenticated qubits. Authenticity
of these qubits are essential for guaranteeing the security of Protocol 2. It is easy to see
that Protocol 1 works correctly if Eve is not present.
Suppose Alice sends to Bob a frame of N +M qubits using Protocol 1. The idea is
that Eve cannot interact with the qubits with vanishing probability of being detected by
Bob. According to Propositions 3 and 4, because of the special choice of pk’s and θk’s,
if Eve performs a measurement (possibly after an arbitrary rotation) on any one of the
check qubits, the probability that her action produces an error detectable by Bob is at least
Pe = 1/4.
Now suppose Eve decides to inspect L qubits at random in the frame. The probability
that out of L qubits, k are check qubits is as follows:
Prob(Eve picks k check qubits) =
(
N
L−k
)(
M
k
)
(
M+N
L
) .
The probability that Eve goes undetected given she inspects k check qubits is as follows:
Prob(Eve undetected | k) = (1− Pe)
k.
Therefore the probability that Eve’s interaction is detected when she inspects L qubits in
the frame at random is:
Prob(Eve undetected when she inspects L qubits) =
L∑
k=0
(1− Pe)
k
(
N
L−k
)(
M
k
)
(
M+N
L
) . (3)
It is easy to compute, either by using Equation (3) or directly, the following extreme cases:
I. Eve decides to inspect all qubits in a frame. The probability that her action is not
detected is:
Prob(Eve undetected) = (1− Pe)
M .
If she succeeds, she has been able to measure all N qubits that were supposed to be
protected. This event can be made arbitrarily improbable by increasing the number
of check qubits M .
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II. Eve decides to inspect only one qubit in a frame. The probability that her action is
not detected:
Prob(Eve undetected) = 1−
MPe
N +M
.
If she succeeds, at best she has been able to measure only one of the N qubits. The
probability of this event can only be made as small as (1− Pe) by increasing M .
In both cases, increasing M implies decreasing the probability that Eve is not detected.
In another attack on this protocol, Eve does not measure the qubits but attempts to
replace them with her own. Suppose she wishes to send L qubits of her own. She must
choose L < N qubits in the frame to be replaced. Lack of any knowledge about the position
of check qubits makes her guess randomly. She will be lucky if she selects none of the check
qubits. The probability of this event is
(
N
L
)
/
(
M+N
L
)
. This probability can be made a small as
desired by choosing a sufficiently large numberM of check qubits. In general, by increasing
parameter M , we can make the probability that Eve’s measurement or replacement of L
qubits goes undetected as small as desired.
5 Conclusion
We introduced and analyzed two novel quantum protocols that together allow a secure
transfer of classical data bits. The first protocol enables Alice and Bob to exchange authen-
ticated qubits. The second protocol, which makes use of the first one, enables Alice and
Bob to exchange data bits securely. The combination has the following merits:
a) It can send data over the quantum channel securely. This is especially useful in key
distribution applications where keys are generated in advance rather than on the fly.
BB84 and its variants cannot transfer predetermined keys.
b) In BB84, some information leaks out, therefore a process called privacy amplification
is required by that protocol. In our protocol, no information about the data leaks
out.
c) Our protocol, unlike BB84, is not vulnerable to multi-qubit emission attack.
One disadvantage of our protocol is its round trip requirement. This is a price to pay to
protect against multi-qubit emission attack. While we have discussed most probable attack
scenarios, there is more to be done to prove the unconditional security of this protocol.
Appendix A
Claim 1 We show that for all α, if
n ≥ 2, pk =
1
n
, θk =
2kpi
n
, for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 1.
then the following holds:
n−1∑
k=0
pk cos
2 θk − α
2
=
n−1∑
k=0
pk sin
2 θk − α
2
. (4)
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Proof. Equation (4) implies:
n−1∑
k=0
pk cos(θk − α) = 0.
Note that the left hand side of the above equation can be written as:
n−1∑
k=0
pk rθk · rα = 0,
where rθk and rα are two units vectors located at the origin in the xz-plane making an angle
θk and α with the z-axis, respectively. The above equation must hold for any rα, therefore
we must have:
n−1∑
k=0
pk rθk = 0,
If we set pk =
1
n
then we must have:
n−1∑
k=0
rθk = 0,
This can be made true by setting:
θk =
2kpi
n
, for k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 1.
The claim is proved. ✸
Claim 2 Proposition 4 is true.
Proof. The error probability given in Equation(2) can be re-written using trigonometric
identities as:
Prob(error) =
1
2
−
1
2
n−1∑
k=0
pk
[
cos2 θk cosα+ cos θk sin θk sinα
]
.
By setting pk =
1
n
, and θk =
2kpi
n
, we arrive at:
Prob(error) =
1
2
−
1
2n
n−1∑
k=0
cos2
2kpi
n
cosα−
1
2n
n−1∑
k=0
cos
2kpi
n
sin
2kpi
n
sinα.
Now note that for any n > 2:
n−1∑
k=0
cos
2kpi
n
sin
2kpi
n
= 0.
This can be easily verified by noticing that for i > 0 the terms corresponding to k = i and
k = n − i cancel each other out. For k = 0, the term is already zero, and when n is even,
the term corresponding to k = n/2 is also zero.
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Other the other hand, notice that for any n > 1:
n−1∑
k=0
cos2
2kpi
n
=
n
2
.
This is true because:
n−1∑
k=0
cos2
2kpi
n
=
1
2
n−1∑
k=0
(1− cos
4kpi
n
) =
n
2
−
1
2
n−1∑
k=0
cos
4kpi
n
.
(It can be easily shown that
∑
n−1
k=0
cos 4kpi
n
= 0.) Therefore, finally:
Prob(error) =
1
2
−
1
4
cosα ≥
1
4
,
with equality when α = 0. ✸
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